The End of the American Century? Interdependence, Soft Power, and the Liberal Order

Last month, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, who recently passed away, published an article in Foreign Affairs titled The End of the Long American Century. In it, they argue that America’s soft power has been weakened as a result of Trump’s policies. The authors contend that the U.S. cannot sustain its military and economic power without soft power, and they warn that Trump’s steps—such as imposing tariffs, withdrawing from international agreements, and adopting punitive policies toward allies—have eroded American soft power in the long run. The article argues that the real strength of the U.S. comes from an order based on mutual interdependence, and that severing these ties will erode America’s global supremacy. It claims that Trump simultaneously tried to impose America on the world and withdraw from it, and that by targeting mutual interdependence, he undermined the very foundations of American power.

THE EROSION OF AMERICAN SOFT POWER

One of the most striking points in Nye and Keohane’s article is the argument that America’s soft power—based on its ‘power of attraction’—was recklessly and unknowingly damaged by Trump. While the article might be criticized for overestimating the value of soft power, it does not fully grapple with the reality that the U.S. has managed to preserve its allure through many crises (Vietnam, Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis, COVID-19) thanks to its military and economic strength. That’s not to say soft power is unimportant, of course—but the article arguably overstates the role of global institutions. Although institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, and the IMF have long faced a profound international system crisis, we have yet to see any real alternative to their role in maintaining global political and economic order.

Another point the authors place great emphasis on is the idea that Trump’s foreign policy weakened the international order. But this raises the risk of forgetting that Trumpist populism was not a cause but rather a symptom. Developments such as China’s rise, Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, the Global South’s turn toward balancing and diversification policies, and deep economic inequalities fueling nationalist responses cannot be reduced to the Trump era. On the contrary, Trump can be seen as the response of a superpower unsure how to handle these shifts, resorting to force in an attempt to reassert its authority. The punitive measures Trump employed while trying to restructure relations with interdependent nations—mentioned in the article—could perhaps best be understood as an expression of helplessness.

THE DYNAMICS OF MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE

One of the more interesting observations in Nye and Keohane’s analysis of interdependence is that countries running trade deficits may hold more leverage in such relationships. In the case of U.S.-China relations, for instance, the U.S., with its larger trade deficit, holds potent tools like tariffs against China, which is more dependent on exports. Yet China’s capacity for retaliation should not be underestimated either. In trade with Canada and Mexico, the U.S. again has short-term leverage to compel more compliant behavior. However, coercive methods enabled by hard power may corrode soft power and, over the long term, undermine America’s core strengths. The authors cite Gallup research conducted in 133 countries, which shows that while the U.S. remains more attractive (with a score of 81) than China (52), Trump’s policies risk damaging that advantage.

The article argues that economic globalization ultimately benefits American power, and it highlights the tendency of populist leaders to scapegoat immigrants and foreigners while ignoring the growing role of technology and capital. It claims that while economic globalization could theoretically be reversed, if the U.S. were to lose its leadership position on cross-border issues like climate change and pandemics, it would essentially be “shooting itself in the foot.” The authors argue that Trump failed to understand how deeply American power is tied to interdependence, and they suggest that an overreliance on tariffs and sanctions would chip away at the international order led by the U.S. These criticisms are valid to some extent, but the common weakness of arguments defending the liberal capitalist order is their failure to address the structural flaws of the international system or to propose constructive alternatives to its current deadlocks.

While it’s hard to disagree with the authors’ claim that there is no turning back from global interdependence, it is equally important to acknowledge that this new ‘complex’ order is generating increasingly intricate problems. It’s true that Trump approached the issue with a hatchet rather than a scalpel—but it’s also important to recognize that technological advances, particularly artificial intelligence, have both modernized the global capitalist system and made its structural issues even harder to resolve. America’s long-standing stewardship of the global order and its role as the guardian of a rules-based international system do not mean that the system has been free of inequality, injustice, or lawlessness. While Nye and Keohane are right to argue that American power is based as much on soft power as on military and economic strength, they could have strengthened their thesis by also acknowledging that this same soft power has been among the contributors to the global systemic crisis.

The liberal view, which sees American power as inherently positive, tends to treat the system crisis as little more than a bump in the road. Arguing that Trumpist policies have destabilized the system—and thus undermined American power—without offering a critical view of the international capitalist liberal order can be interpreted as a call for more ‘reasonable’ populism. There is no doubt that the U.S. has benefited from trade based on global interdependence, but the role of soft power in building and sustaining that order is not on the same level as its military or economic might. While the article declares the end of the American century, it also assumes that the era of Pax Americana it created was fundamentally a positive one—overlooking the realities of deepening global inequality and ongoing regional conflicts.